

Weekly



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MENA Weekly Summary - July 22-28, 2026

Highlights of the Week

This report reviews notable events in the Middle East and North Africa this week. These include an outbreak of protests and unrest in **Libya** to denounce power outages, violent confrontations between **Israelis** and **Palestinians** in the **West Bank**, an escalation of Axis of Resistance attacks emanating from **Yemen** and **Iraq** targeting oil infrastructure in **Saudi Arabia**, the establishment of a new opposition party in **Turkey**, and the renewed risks of escalation between the US and **Iran** after a surprise missile attack targeting **Jordan**.

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Current Situation

1. During the overnight hours (Iran time) on July 28-29, US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched multiple ballistic missiles from Iran in

“an attempted surprise attack” on US forces based in the Middle East. CENTCOM confirmed that all missiles were intercepted.

2. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) announced that they intercepted five missiles and IRGC-linked media claimed that the attack was aimed at the Muwaffaq Salti Air Base.
3. The IRGC claimed responsibility for targeting the base with “several ballistic missiles.” The statement vowed to maintain resistance for as long as US threats and actions against Iran continued.

Assessments & Forecast: The attack is highly notable as it breaks a six-day lull in direct exchanges of fire between the parties. Tehran conducted the attack unprovoked without any indication that the US had conducted any attack on Iranian soil. Thus, this marks a shift from Tehran’s primarily reactionary stance in recent weeks, wherein it has launched aerial attacks only after US strikes on its territory, which were themselves preceded by Iranian maritime attacks in the Strait of Hormuz. Together with Tehran’s persistent hardline position on the Strait of Hormuz and its reported rejection of Oman’s most recent mediation effort to reach an agreement on the management of the chokepoint, it highlights Tehran’s emboldened and defiant stance vis-a-vis Washington. This is further compounded by the escalation dynamic between the Houthis and Iraq-based Axis of Resistance members vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, which further underscores the emboldened stance of the Iran-led camp. This will prompt an escalation dynamic, as was highlighted by emerging reports from the afternoon hours of July 29 that the US has already launched retaliatory strikes on Iranian soil, which will in turn likely prompt Iranian attacks against neighboring states.

Source: [CENTCOM](#)

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
Current Situation

1. On July 24-25, the Saudi-led Coalition Forces stated that they had targeted Houthi military targets in Hodeidah and Kamaran Island.
2. On July 25, the Houthis targeted Saudi Arabian Oil Company (ARAMCO) facilities in Jazan and Yanbu.
3. Between July 27-29, Saudi Arabia reported intercepting several projectiles launched from Iraq targeting energy infrastructure in its Eastern Province, including the [Abqaiq oil processing facility](#).
4. On July 28-29, US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted joint strikes with Saudi Arabian Armed Forces against Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) targets in eastern Iraq.
5. On July 28, the Houthis announced targeting a Saudi oil tanker, “NCC Ghazal,” with several ballistic missiles for violating the naval blockade.

Assessments & Forecast: The Saudi-Houthi confrontation has expanded significantly over the past week, with the Houthis increasing pressure on Riyadh through attacks targeting Saudi energy infrastructure and efforts to disrupt maritime activity in the Red Sea. The escalation aligns with Iran’s broader objective of increasing pressure on the US and Gulf states by threatening regional energy security and key maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, through which significant volumes of

Saudi energy exports transit amid the US-Iran conflict. In this context, Iran-aligned groups are likely to continue targeting Saudi energy assets, such as Abqaiq and the East-West pipeline, highlighting the growing vulnerability of the Kingdom's economic infrastructure. Saudi Arabia has sought to restore deterrence through joint strikes with US forces against Iran-backed Iraqi militias. Riyadh's public acknowledgment of the operation also serves as a signal to Baghdad that it expects Iraqi authorities to prevent their territory from being used to launch attacks against the Kingdom. In Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition is also likely to conduct direct strikes against Houthi targets, which will prompt Houthi attacks on Saudi assets in the Red Sea and in southern Saudi Arabia. Riyadh will also increase support for the anti-Houthi forces to increase pressure along Yemen's frontlines, and compel the Houthis to divert resources from attacks against Saudi interests toward domestic territorial defense. Overall, these developments are liable to accelerate a broader regional escalation involving Iran-aligned actors and Saudi Arabia.

SAUDI OIL FACILITIES TARGETED BETWEEN JULY 25-27



Source: [Saudi-led Coalition](#); [Houthis](#)

Libya

Current Situation

1. During the evening hours (local time) of July 25, residents reportedly staged protests denouncing [power outages](#) across western Libya's Tripolitania region, including Tripoli's Souq al-Jumaa neighborhood, Tajoura, and Janzour.
2. On July 26, the Souq al-Jumaa movement called for nationwide demonstrations to overthrow the "corrupt" Government of National Unity (GNU), emphasizing grievances beyond service failures, instead seeking to "thwart" and remove the GNU. Additional movements reportedly announced their participation in the civil disobedience campaign.
3. During the night hours of July 26, demonstrations reportedly erupted in multiple cities in Tripolitania, including Tripoli, Janzour, Bani Walid, and Misrata.
4. On [July 28](#), the Workers Union of the Mellitah Oil and Gas Complex said that protestors stormed the complex and temporarily halted operations.

Assessments & Forecast: The latest protest wave emerges amid Libya's worsening electricity crisis, which has periodically triggered localized [civil unrest](#). While electricity cuts were likely the immediate catalyst, the protests reflect broader socioeconomic and political grievances in Tripolitania, including rising living costs, perceived GNU corruption, and frustration over the stalled electoral process. The protest movement will likely continue linking broader fuel shortages, [including diesel](#), to longstanding allegations of fuel smuggling facilitated by Libya's political elite for personal gain, reinforcing broader political grievances underpinning the country's socioeconomic crisis. Despite its spread within Tripolitania, the protest movement is not expected to expand geographically into other regions at this time. In the coming days, authorities will likely arrest Souq al-Jumaa members and other protesters to disrupt the movement. However, demonstrations are likely to persist across Tripolitania, including at strategically significant oil and gas facilities.

Source: [Souq al-Jumaa Movement](#)

Palestinian Territories & Israel

Current Situation

1. On [July 24](#), a confrontation erupted after Israelis approached the Palestinian village of Tell, prompting the deployment of Israeli military personnel to the site. Security forces neutralized a Palestinian who seized an Israeli security officer's assault rifle and opened fire, killing him and an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier. Three additional Palestinians were killed.
2. During a confrontation on [July 25](#) between Israeli settlers and Palestinians near the southern West Bank's Susya, a Palestinian seized the weapon of an off-duty IDF reservist and fired into the air.
3. Overnight on July 25-26, Israelis set fire to mosques and homes in the Palestinian villages of Kur and Qusra in suspected revenge attacks.

Assessments & Forecast: These developments highlight the significantly heightened tensions that can rapidly escalate into lethal confrontations between Israelis and Palestinians in the West Bank. As underscored by the incidents on July 24 and 25, this is

partly facilitated by the presence of firearms, even under authorized possession, which can be snatched and used in opportunistic violence. Against this backdrop, Israel's defense establishment will likely adopt an elevated security posture in the coming weeks. This is reflected by the reported increase in IDF West Bank deployment from 22 battalions in the last fortnight to 26 battalions according to July 27 reports, and Defense Minister Israel Katz's July 27 directives for the IDF to expand counterterrorism activity and prepare to establish a permanent presence in another [Palestinian refugee camp](#). In turn, this will fuel the risk of retaliatory Palestinian militancy and an elevated likelihood of [protests](#) by left-wing groups within Israel denouncing West Bank security measures and settler violence.

Source: [Kan](#)

Turkey

Current Situation

1. Former Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Ozgur Ozel formally resigned from the CHP on July 24 alongside 90 CHP lawmakers to establish the Yeni Party
2. The newly established party unanimously elected Ozel as Chairman and, at its founding congress, appointed an 80-member Party Council and a 15-member High Disciplinary Board.
3. Former Istanbul Mayor and Presidential candidate Ekrem Imamoglu publicly endorsed the new movement, calling on supporters to unite behind Ozel's leadership.

Assessments & Forecast: Yeni Party's emergence with 91 lawmakers has immediately established it as Turkey's second-largest parliamentary bloc and the main opposition party, providing Ozel with a stronger institutional foundation than previous breakaway parties. Imamoglu's endorsement seeks to preserve the same partnership that led the CHP to a landslide victory over President Recep Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2024 local elections, thereby consolidating support for Ozel ahead of the 2028 Presidential elections. However, Yeni Party's long-term viability will depend on persuading voters that it represents more than a continuation of the CHP by developing a distinct political identity and policy platform while maintaining cohesion among defecting lawmakers. Yeni Party will also face sustained legal and administrative challenges that could hinder recruitment, fundraising, and organizational expansion, already evidenced by the judicial intervention that reinstated CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu on [May 21](#) and precipitated Ozel's departure. It would also be consistent with previous actions targeting CHP-controlled municipalities and senior opposition figures, including [Imamoglu](#). Similar legal measures against Yeni Party leaders or municipalities aligned with the party will therefore be perceived by supporters as politically motivated and act as catalysts for renewed protests over the coming weeks.

Source: [Yeni Party](#), [Ekrem Imamoglu](#)

Other Developments

Egypt: On July 22, the Egyptian Parliament reportedly approved four oil and gas exploration agreements in the Nile Delta, the Mediterranean Sea, Egypt's eastern desert, and North Sinai.

Iraq & Syria: On July 25, the Iraqi cabinet authorized the Basra Oil Company to sign an MoU with the Syrian Ministry of Energy to establish a pipeline that would link Iraqi oil production to global markets.

Israel & Lebanon: The IDF stated that Hezbollah launched an explosive-laden UAV toward an IDF engineering vehicle in southern Lebanon's Ali Taher Ridge during the overnight hours of July 28-29. The IDF characterized the attack as a violation of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement.

Israel & Palestinian Territories: On July 26, Israel's Security Cabinet approved a limited pilot deployment of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) in southern Gaza's Rafah, under which the IDF would withdraw from designated zones before the ISF deploys.

Qatar: According to July 28 reports, QatarEnergy has extended force majeure on LNG shipments for Asian and European markets until the end of September due to expected continued export disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz.

Saudi Arabia: On July 22, the US and Saudi Arabia reportedly signed a nuclear agreement for a civilian nuclear program that will potentially allow Riyadh to enrich uranium. US President Donald Trump stated in a social media post on July 23 that there would be "no enrichment," and that the accord was conditional on Saudi Arabia joining the Abraham Accords.

Tunisia: On Republic Day, thousands of protestors demonstrated against deteriorating living conditions in Tunis on July 25. The protests also marked the fifth anniversary of the exceptional measures taken by President Kais Saied in 2021.

Turkey: Unidentified gunmen shot and killed a Justice and Development Party (AKP) official, Mehmet Direk, and two of his relatives at a cemetery in Batman's Guneykent neighborhood on July 26. The incident's background remains unclear.

The Upcoming Week

- **July 30: Morocco** will observe Throne Day, commemorating the accession of King Mohammed V to the throne in 1927.
- **July 31:** This date marks the second anniversary of **Israel's** assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh, who was killed in **Iran** on [July 31, 2024](#).
- **July 31-August 2:** The Yazidi community in **the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)** will celebrate the Yazidi Peak Summer, a three-day festival and holiday to mark the 40th day of the

summer season.

- **August 1: Lebanon** will celebrate the Lebanese Army Day, commemorating the Lebanese Armed Forces' (LAF) founding, and honoring soldiers and fallen troops.
- **August 3-4: Iraqi** authorities have declared a public holiday for Arbreen, a Shiite religious occasion honoring the martyrdom of Husain ibn Ali. Millions of believers are expected to participate in the Arbreen pilgrimage from Majaf to Karbala.
- **August 4: Algeria** will mark the National Day of the People's National Army, commemorating the military's role in the country's independence, state-building, and the protection of national unity and sovereignty. Official ceremonies are expected to be held.
- **August 4: Lebanon** will commemorate the sixth anniversary of the 2020 Port of Beirut Blast as a public holiday. Civil society groups are expected to hold demonstrations, vigils, and memorial events nationwide, particularly in Beirut.
- **August 4-6:** The seventh round of US-brokered **Israel-Lebanon** talks is slated to be held in Italy's capital, Rome. The talks are expected to focus on implementing the [framework agreement](#), including an expansion of the pilot areas.